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In 2001 Prime Minister Helen Clark declared that New Zealand 
was ‘the most strategically secure country in the world’.1 Upon 
that basis, and hearkening back to the foreign policy approach of 
prior Labour administrations, she pursued an approach to inter-
national affairs known as liberal internationalism. This empha-
sised the promotion of human rights and democracy; support 
for international institutions; the encouragement of disarmament 
and the promotion of free trade. In fact, her foreign policy was 
arguably the most liberal internationalist of any New Zealand 
government ever. 
The current National government has developed a less san-
guine view of the security environment and the threats it poses 
to New Zealand. Instead, and true to its ideological heritage, it 
has sought to re-focus New Zealand’s foreign policy efforts upon 
core national interests, perceived to be trade and strengthening 
alliances. This approach to international affairs is captured by the 
foreign affairs theory of realism, which is less concerned with the 
promotion of ideals than liberalism.
Although every New Zealand foreign policy contains a mix 
of realist and liberal elements, these two paradigms have been 
engaged in a struggle over the general course of New Zealand 
foreign policy since the 1930s.2 However, realism and liberalism, 
when theoretically and practically isolated from one another, op-
erate akin to ideologies: they simplify the complexity of the world 
— thus systematically distorting it — and attract passionate ad-
herents to their side, with practical consequences for foreign pol-
icy. In this article I contend that neither position is sufficient for 
an increasingly complex, integrated and multi-polarising world. 
Nor do they suit the defensive realist system that has emerged 
over the past decades. 
Together, globalisation and defensive realism have created 
a new international structure. The norms, practices and incen-
tives for co-operation of this system are ascendant but often go 
overlooked. New Zealand’s foreign policy strategy should take 
this new operative environment into account. If it does not, it 
could miss the unique co-operative opportunities inherent in the 
present international configuration. Therefore, the essential con-
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could help transcend major regional security issues. These efforts 
would be strengthened by an approach we could dub ‘Kiwi maxi-
malism’ — a conscious political decision to frame our objectives 
as more far-reaching than appears currently plausible.
Contemporary system
‘Globalisation’ refers to the expansion of integrated economic 
structures, diffusion of communications and technology. Prior to 
1991, ‘security’ was defined by the national struggle in Cold War 
parameters for power, whether military, economic or ideologi-
cal. Since then, new security threats have emerged that threaten 
both national and international security. Additionally, the tighter 
the integrated components of the system become, the more likely 
destabilising events abroad will cause systemic reverberations 
throughout the system and affect geographically remote states, 
such as New Zealand.4
In this situation many threats can only be combated by a view 
of security that requires states to work together. Traditional real-
ist ‘self-help’ notions of security become counter-productive — all 
states that seek security in the modern international environment 
are dependent on one another. Moreover, since New Zealand’s 
interests are bound up in the security of the international eco-
nomic system, it has a stake in stabilising the system as a whole, 
and especially its wider region, the Asia–Pacific.
Alongside the deepening process of globalisation, realism 
has undergone its own transformation since the end of the Cold 
War. It has separated into ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ schools of 
thought. Offensive realists believe that states are greedy ‘power-
maximisers’, whereby achieving hegemony over other states is the 
only means to guarantee a state’s security. Aggression and coer-
cion become the inevitable recourse in an offensive realist world. 
In contrast, defensive realists hold that states are ‘security seekers’ 
and moderate their behaviour towards this end. Since security is 
indivisible in a globalised international system, states can only 
improve their security positions by working with one another. 
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Owing to their assumptions, offensive and defensive realists 
have very different views of the ‘security dilemma’. This dilemma 
refers to a situation whereby a state, intending to improve its secu-
rity position by increasing its military strength or through an alli-
ance, leads other states to respond in similar fashion, heightening 
tension and the chance of conflict between them even when nei-
ther state desires it; a net decrease in security occurs. For offensive 
realists, there is no dilemma since states are inherently greedy 
— it is a zero-sum situation. For defensive realists the dilemma is 
real and a tragic misunderstanding. Fortunately, as long as both 
sides recognise this, it can be overcome through programmatic 
steps to reassure one another and transform either state’s view of 
the other’s intention; peace and rapprochement are possible.  
Transformed system
Shiping Tang has convincingly shown that the international sys-
tem has transformed from one comprised primarily of offensive 
realist states to one comprised today chiefly of defensive realist 
states.5 In a defensive world, states that pursue offensive strate-
gies are punished for their behaviour. The two most recent cases 
of powerful states pursuing their interests in an overtly offensive 
in the Asia–Pacific region.
New paradigm
The two words that comprise strategic liberalism as a paradigm 
— ‘strategic’ and ‘liberalism’ — are not oxymoronic. In fact, the 
paradigm unites realism’s focus on national interests and liberal-
ism in significant ways. Its prescriptions are strategic in that their 
pursuit is designed to improve the security position of the states 
involved in the endeavour, thus recognising their national inter-
ests, and liberal in that it requires and strengthens co-operation 
amongst them. The two proposals below represent a maximalist 
approach: they may be more far-reaching than appears currently 
plausible or possible. This ‘Kiwi maximalism’ is conscious and 
aligns naturally with the ethos and other principles that underpin 
strategic liberalism. 
Taking a cue from the international relations approach 
known as constructivism, strategic liberalism asserts that our 
reality is socially constructed, and thus what we make of it. Al-
though human nature will remain unchangeable for the foresee-
able future, its energy can be directed towards its better self and 
concerned with the welfare of others. It also assumes that stra-
tegic futures are inherently indeterminate and that we need not 
repeat the tragic mistakes of the past. This approach also requires 
New Zealand to emphasise ‘open polylateralism’: commitment 
to permanent partnerships in international affairs and open mul-
tilateral architectures that do not exclude other states. This con-
sciously runs counter to the traditional realist notion that states 
only have interests, not permanent friends of allies. This is not 
an academic point: closed multilateral and security architectures 
generate feelings of insecurity amongst others, generating pres-
sures to form countervailing alliances. This brings us back to the 
system-transcendent goals of strategic liberalism, which, initially, 
could be directed towards overcoming security dilemmas in the 
Asia–Pacific region. 
New Zealand’s embrace of strategic liberal principles would 
be greatly facilitated if it was buttressed by dedicated institutional 
support. This could come in the form of a world-class think tank 
— let us call it the Centre for Asia–Pacific Strategic Co-operation 
— whose primary objective was research into and promotion of 
ambitious international security and peace initiatives. It would 
make an intellectual and material contribution towards this end. 
Leading conceptual collaboration with actors around the region 
would be paramount, as would be emphasising the need for avant 
garde ideas and dissimulation of best practices. Incentives would 
be needed to bring to New Zealand the best and brightest intel-
lectuals from across the Asia–Pacific.
   Strategic Liberalism – Core Principles and Assumptions
manner lends support to this 
position. The Bush admin-
istration in 2003 operated 
as an offensive state when 
it invaded Iraq, and more 
recently Russia acted offen-
sively in Eastern Europe. 
Both operated out of step 
with the current defensive 
realist international environ-
ment and were, predictably, 
punished. Shiping Tang
Because expansionism no longer pays, defensive/co-operative 
strategies become the norm. As a consequence, a majority of 
states today have been socialised into perceiving the use of mili-
tary force to settle most disputes as illegitimate. Even though ten-
sions do exist, this view is held by most states in the Asia–Pacific 
region, evident in the proliferation of state-to-state contacts and 
multilateral forums and in the fact that they all have a common 
interest in ensuring economic growth is not derailed. Tang’s the-
sis is supported by the fact that general deterrence between states, 
rather than conflict, has become internalised, while nuclear 
weapons and economic inter-dependencies have reduced the pos-
sibility of great power wars breaking out. In contrast, offensive 
realism, which calls for a self-conscious effort to contain rising 
powers, will likely prove costly and create a self-fulfilling proph-
ecy of confrontation in the region. My research and analysis else-
where provides further support for defensive realism.6
Recognising that overall security is reduced when states take 
aggressive unilateral decisions in the realm of strategic–military 
affairs opens space for a new co-operative approach, one in which 
states can seek security without intentionally decreasing that 
of others. The current international structure makes it possible 
for strategic gains to be made by most states in the Asia–Pacific 
simultaneously and has provided room for efforts to transcend 
security dilemmas in the region, reducing the permutations of 
confrontation in the process. New Zealand could take advantage 
of this situation by explicitly adopting a new security paradigm 
— strategic liberalism — that will maximise security for all states 
l Anti-determinism; strategic futures are indeterminate
l Global interest; common interest; human interest
l Polylateralism; emphasise permanent partnerships
l Non-exclusionary; open and transparent activities  
l Avant-garde; encouragement and utilisation of new 
thinking
l Best practice; dissimulation of expertise and knowledge
l System-transcendent; approaches that seek to overcome 
security dilemmas
l Maximalism; strive for ambitious goals that maximise 
common interests.
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Advancing disarmament
As a maximalist objective New Zealand should work to forge 
an Asia–Pacific compact that pauses current military acquisition 
processes, prevents new acquisition programmes and eliminates 
existing stockpiles of conventional and non-conventional weap-
ons. 
This first vector of research and advocacy of New Zealand’s 
strategic liberal portfolio would be a focus on contemporary dis-
armament issues and a re-invigorated push for conventional and 
non-conventional arms control. This would include arms control 
accords to curb research into new weaponry, which could desta-
bilise political relations. After all, an arms race is driven not just 
by the need for greater quantities of weapons but by perpetual 
advances in weapons research in order to ensure a state’s capa-
bilities remain equal, if not superior, to the those of others. Once 
developed, pressures emerge from the military-industrial system 
to purchase and deploy new weaponry, creating a spiral of incen-
tives that may not be driven by the needs of strategy or reflect 
the level of objective threat posed to the country. Furthermore, 
identifying cutting-edge technologies that may prove beneficial 
to the domestic economy but have dual-use military applications 
will also need to be taken into account (such as genetic weap-
onry, robotics, space-based weapons and artificial intelligence 
programmes).
Significant conceptual work is required on the link between 
conventional and non-conventional (nuclear) arms. New Zea-
land cannot just say the world would be safer in the absence of 
nuclear weapons because there is a case to be made that state-to-
state conflict has been greatly restrained since the dawn of the 
nuclear age. Nor should we charge that nuclear arms are ‘useless’ 
since they have not been used since the end of the Second World 
War. This misses the strategic-functional utility that comes from 
holding nuclear weapons and how they have been utilised in-
directly on numerous occasions. For example, during the Cold 
War nuclear weapons facilitated conventional power projection 
by the super-powers. It allowed either state to intervene with im-
punity within their ‘sphere of influence’ and throughout parts 
of the Third World, secure in the knowledge that the other side 
would not directly intervene against its conventional forces in 
the field. Nuclear forces thus underpinned either super-power’s 
freedom of action. This was clearly understood by US officials. 
Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown stated before Con-
gress in 1980 that ‘our strategic nuclear capabilities provide the 
foundation on which our security rests. With them, our other 
staff for strategic deterrence, stated that ‘Nuclear deterrence un-
derpins all of our freedom of movement everywhere.’9 For Rus-
sia’s part, Vladimir Putin surely felt safe in the knowledge that 
US and NATO forces could not come to the aid of their partners 
in Georgia during Russia’s invasion in 2008, and the same ap-
pears to apply vis-à-vis its activities in the east of Ukraine today. 
Indeed, in a recent documentary on Russian television called 
‘World Order’, Putin said ‘Russia will continue perfecting its [nu-
clear] weapons. The nuclear triad forms the basis of our security 
policy.’10 Russia has also not been beyond issuing veiled nuclear 
threats in recent years or preparing to put its nuclear arms on 
standby during times of crisis. 
The above arguments need to be engaged squarely, especially 
as most of the nuclear powers are upgrading and transforming 
their arsenals today. Furthermore, the prospects for this objective 
will be greatly strengthened if they are pursued alongside an ef-
fort in the Asia–Pacific region to programmatically improve the 
overall tenor of relations between the United States and China. 
Promoting rapprochement 
New Zealand should, as another maximalist objective, play an 
instrumental role to ensure a security dilemma does not emerge 
between the United States and China in the Asia–Pacific region, 
and make it an explicit foreign policy objective to forge an alli-
ance with China at the same time that it sustains and deepens its 
relationsip with the United States. 
There is no more urgent task for global diplomats and interna-
tional relations scholars than creating the conditions for China’s 
rise to take place peacefully. Applying strategic liberalism and
‘Kiwi maximalism’ opens up a horizon of far-sighted and ambi-
tious strategic objectives regarding the US–China relationship 
and the role New Zealand could conceivably play in their pro-
motion. New Zealand can utilise its unique geographic position, 
and excellent relations with both states, to promote co-operation 
and confidence-building between them in the Asia–Pacific re-
gion. New Zealand could act as a conduit, identifying trilateral 
and multilateral opportunities for joint military exercises, as well 
as related counter-transnational organised crime, counter-terror, 
humanitarian and disaster-relief exercises. In fact, military-to-
military interaction has already taken place under New Zealand 
auspices. For example, in Christchurch in August 2013 the three 
countries conducted disaster response and humanitarian exercis-
es together during Phoenix Spirit. During Operation Southern 
Katipo, held in the South Island in October–November 2015, 
New Zealand brought together nine countries. Although China 
did not formally join the exercise, it attended in an observer ca-
pacity. 
New Zealand is deepening its defence relations with the 
United States and China simultaneously, a fact that will enhance 
our ability to pursue additional co-operative activities with them. 
Indeed, in November 2015 Defence Minister Gerry Brownlee 
gave a speech to China’s National Defence University, where he 
complimented China for its role in disaster relief and humanitar-
ian missions, describing it as ‘having demonstrated its capacity 
as a responsible world actor’, and called China a ‘true Strategic 
Partner’ for New Zealand. Brownlee also announced a new five-
year engagement plan between the People’s Liberation Army and 
the New Zealand Defence Force, the first between China and 
a Western military.11 These are positive steps but a maximalist 
approach would take them further by framing them as steps on 
forces become meaningful 
instruments of military and 
political power’.7 After the 
Cold War, an official 1995 
document produced by the 
Policy Subcommittee of the 
Strategic Advisory Group 
of the US Strategic Com-
mand on the ‘essentials’ of 
post-Cold War deterrence ex-
plained that ‘nuclear weapons 
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US is engaged’.8 As recently 
as 2009 Major-General Don-
ald Alston, assistant chief of 
Major-General Donald Alston
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the way towards forging an alliance with China, akin to the re-
lationship New Zealand currently has with its Western partners 
and allies.
Track II forums and workshops would complement the above 
efforts. A strategic liberal framework would ensure an ‘outside 
the box’ and ‘no issues off the table’ conceptual approach. This 
is critical. Day to day, week to week, month to month and year 
to year, an inexorable change in the global — and regional — 
balance of power is taking place between China and the United 
States, and it is the thousands of small decisions and changes 
in interpretation of the other state’s intentions that will deter-
mine the future stability of the Asia–Pacific region, and whether 
a co-operative mode of behaviour prevails. Therefore, concep-
tual alignment between the United States and China over the 
makeup of the future multilateral and institutional architecture 
in the Asia–Pacific is required, and it is currently lacking. With-
out this the on-going US ‘rebalance’, or ‘pivot’, to Asia will only 
encourage China to believe that Washington is pursuing a neo-
containment strategy by bolstering domestic elements in China 
that view security relations in zero-sum terms, thereby generating 
an acute security dilemma. 
New Zealand could construct an explicit reassurance pro-
gramme to promote between the United States and China. It 
would involve incremental step-by-step efforts in the military 
and non-military realms, centred on reciprocal restraint, in an 
effort to build trust and create a cycle of co-operation. Initial sig-
nals act as feelers and require a corresponding reaction to induce 
further steps. The most significant signals involve a state opting 
to unilaterally decrease its forces and engage in joint arms con-
trol efforts to modify military postures and capabilities in a way 
that decreases the ability of states to challenge the status quo.12 
Ultimately, reciprocal concessions must reach a point that makes 
it clear that neither state is considering attack or aggression; in 
other words, to take steps that a greedy offensive realist state 
would never take. 
Of critical importance is Charles Kupchan’s recognition that 
National government has inherited a functionalist approach to 
governance, which views governing as an end in itself, and virtue 
rests in stability, prudence and the management of state affairs. 
Speeches announcing ambitious foreign policy goals and outlin-
ing visionary regional proposals are not its cup of tea. 
I can also attest from my time in government that policy-
making and implementation is generally a conservative process 
that seeks to iteratively build upon past practice and apply/adjust 
it to new challenges, opportunities or crises. There are, inevita-
bly, numerous compromises that occur throughout the process 
as multiple individuals, institutions and political actors inject 
themselves and moderate the final outcome. This process has a 
consistent result: risk-aversion. Operators in this context might 
readily dismiss the ideas outlined above as too ambitious and un-
realistic as a basis for policy-making. But embracing the outlined 
approach would be a courageous political act in the truest sense 
of the word, as one that occurs when politicians make the seem-
ingly impossible possible.
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co-operation between democ-
racies and non-democracies is 
possible. Kupchan holds that 
assuming otherwise not only 
reduces the chance for imme-
diate collaboration but also 
‘discourages non-democracies 
from remaining open to mu-
tual accommodation and the 
exchange of concessions — 
steps critical to advancing rec-
onciliation and programmatic 
cooperation’.13 An approach to 
American–Chinese relations 
that emphasises ideological Charles Kupchan
differences all but guarantees that deep forms of co-operation 
will remain out of reach. 
National approach
The Key government should not be discouraged from adopting 
a strategic liberal foreign policy. After all, a number of conserva-
tive statesmen, from Henry Kissinger to George H.W. Bush, are 
remembered for making visionary decisions that were more far-
sighted than most realised at the time. Admittedly, the present 
